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Abstract
This paper sets up a rational inattention model for the choice of
departure time for a traveler facing random travel time. The traveler
chooses how much information to acquire about the travel time out-
come before choosing departure time. This reduces the cost of travel
time variability compared to models in which the information is exoge-
nously fixed .
Keywords: rational inattention; random travel time variability; value of
reliability; discrete choice
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1 Introduction
This paper connects the literature on rational inattention to the issue of
valuing travel time variability.
Traffic congestion imposes very significant costs on developed economies,
with estimates typically in the range of 1 percent of GDP. Traffic conges-
tion not only leads to delays but also causes travel times to be variable and
unpredictable from the point of view of travelers. Nonrecurring traffic con-
gestion (due to accidents, bad weather, special events, and other shocks)
contributes more than half of total delay in US urban areas (Schrank et al.,
2011). Travel time variability thus adds significant economic costs to the
costs of traffic congestion. Valuation of travel time variability is clearly very
important for the evaluation of transport policy.
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The standard theory used to establish a value of travel time variability is
firmly neoclassical (Fosgerau, 2015). Travelers are equipped with scheduling
preferences over departure and arrival time outcomes. They face a random
travel time, but know the statistical distribution of travel time. They choose
a departure time optimally to maximize expected scheduling utility given
the travel time distribution.
It is, however, not clear in this neoclassical model what the relevant travel
time distribution actually is from the point of view of travelers. There are
many possibilities, depending on what information travelers are thought to
take into account and how much effort they are likely to invest in processing
that information. Transportation research has so far had little to say about
this.
There are many information sources that travelers may or may not take
into account. First, of course, they know the time of day and the day
of week. They could plausibly have some idea about how the travel time
distribution varies across those dimensions. Second, some days are special
due to holidays or special events that the traveler might be aware of and
take into account. Current weather is observable and forecasts are easily
available so travelers may be able to factor in the impact of weather in
their anticipated travel time distribution. Travelers may or may not know
about roadworks. Finally, real time traffic information is available from
various sources and travelers may also be able to factor this in, depending
on whether these sources provide information about incidents and delays or
they directly inform about travel times.
Previous research has considered various kinds of information provision
to travelers but has mostly assumed that travelers effortlessly incorporate
all the provided information into their decisions. Paper in transportation
that deal with information include the following. Yang (1998) proposes a
equilibrium model with endogenous market penetration of ATIS which is
dependent on the private travel time saving due to the possession of ATIS.
Avineri and Prashker (2006) compare the route choice behavior with and
without prior static information and concludes that the static information
about expected travel times increases the heterogeneity of travelers’ choices.
Ettema and Timmermans (2006) set up a model that captures the cost
due to bias in the prior knowledge of travel time and demonstrates that
providing information can reduce the bias and improve the expected utility
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of travelers. Paz and Peeta (2009) develop a behavior-consistent approach
for network control which takes the compliance rate of travel information
into consideration. Xiao and Lo (2016) investigate the effect of travel time
information shared by social networks on travelers’ departure time choices.
Ben-Elia et al. (2013) study the influence of information accuracy on route
choice. Lindsey et al. (2014) propose a theoretical model of the relationship
between pre-trip information and the route choice problem under stochastic
traffic conditions. Bifulco et al. (2016) model the impact of ATIS on network
equilibrium and stability.
De Borger and Fosgerau (2012) consider a public transport firm deciding
on provision of time table information, which reduces the travelers’ cost of
planning for a specific departure. In their model, travelers choose whether
or not to plan and hence they decide whether or not to use the information
provided.
It seems unrealistic to assume that travelers make use of all the available
information as that would require considerable effort that could easily out-
weigh the gains from improving the timing of trips. On the other hand, it is
reasonable to expect that travelers take some information into account. It
also seems clear that the travelers’ choice of how much information to take
into account is a choice. It is entirely plausible that this choice depends on
the cost and benefits of information acquisition.
We would therefore like to have a theory underlying the valuation of
travel time variability that takes into account that the information process-
ing strategy of the traveler is a choice that depends on preferences as well
as the distribution of travel times and the cost of information. The broader
consequences of decreases in the cost of information is, of course, a timely
issue with the emergence of near universal access to real time traffic infor-
mation through various services.
So it is very relevant to have a theory for the value of travel time vari-
ability that takes information acquisition into account. The micro-economic
theory of rational inattention is a natural choice of a theoretical framework
for this endeavour (Sims, 2003, 2010). It is a theory that recognizes that
people have limited information processing capability and that the cost of
information processing influences how people behave under uncertainty. Un-
der rational inattention, people choose optimally how much information to
take into account, balancing the cost of information against the gains from
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better informed expectations.
Recently, Mateˇjka and McKay (2015) have shown that rational inatten-
tion can be used to provide a foundation for the multinomial logit model
that does not assume that decision makers have precise evaluations of all
available choice alternatives. Along with most of the previous literature
on rational inattention, they use the Shannon entropy to define the cost of
information.1
This paper sets up a rational inattention model for the traveler choice
of departure time under travel time variability (TTV), where the traveler
also chooses an information strategy. This is in contrast to the neoclassical
model which takes the traveler’s information as given. Here, the traveler’s
information strategy is endogenously chosen, taking the cost of information
into account.
This paper sets up a rational inattention model for a traveler’s choice of
departure time when the travel time is random. We find that the marginal
cost of TTV is always positive and that the traveler’s payoff decreases with
the unit cost of information. The traveler forms a consideration set of depar-
ture times that are chosen with positive probability. A small consideration
set is cheap in terms of information but offers limited possibilities for com-
pensating travel time variability through varying the departure time. A
large consideration set has the converse implications. The consideration set
will then typically have gaps, as we also find in our numerical simulations.
If the scheduling utility is very concave, then the consideration set has no
gaps but then it comprises at most two departure times. In the case where
the traveler has linear scheduling utility rates as in Fosgerau and Engelson
(2011), the marginal cost of TTV found by Fosgerau and Engelson emerges
as a limiting case, with the marginal cost of TTV in the rational inattention
model always being smaller.
Our simulation results also indicate that the cardinality of the consider-
ation set decreases as the information cost increases. The marginal cost of
TTV increases as the unit information cost increases.
Section 2 reviews the neoclassical model for departure time choice under
travel time variability and derives the marginal value of travel time vari-
ability. This is a point of reference for Section 3 that sets up a rational
1Fosgerau et al. (2017) generalize this result to arbitrary additive random utility dis-
crete choice models, using a generalized entropy to define the cost of information.
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inattention model for the context of a traveler deciding the timing of a trip
with uncertain duration. Section 4 derives the marginal value of travel time
variability in the rational inattention model and specializes to the slope and
step models of scheduling preferences. Section 5 presents some numerical
experiments. Section 6 concludes.
2 The neoclassical model
Before presenting the new rational inattention model, we review the neoclas-
sical model in which a traveler chooses departure time to maximize expected
scheduling utility, see Engelson and Fosgerau (2016).
We consider then a traveler about to undertake a trip of uncertain du-
ration. He cares about the timing of the trip, with preferences given by a
scheduling utility u(a, t), where a is the departure time and t is the travel
time, such that a+ t is the arrival time.2
Travel time T is random, taking values in a finite set T . We write p(t) =
P (T = t), assuming without loss of generality that ∀t ∈ T : p (t) > 0. To
talk about travel time variability, we parametrize travel time as T = µ+σX,
where X ∈ X is standardized travel time with EX = 0 and EX2 = 1.
2.1 Scheduling preferences
The traveler’s scheduling preferences are given by a scheduling utility that
is specified in terms of utility rates h,w as follows (Vickrey, 1973; Tseng
and Verhoef, 2008; Engelson and Fosgerau, 2016).
u(a, t) =
∫ a
0
h(t′)dt′ +
∫ 0
a+t
w(t′)dt′. (1)
We assume that h,w > 0 such that travel time is always costly. Then
the traveler prefers to depart later and arrive earlier, ceteris paribus. We
assume also that w(t′) < h(t′) if and only if t′ < 0. This implies that
a traveler with zero travel time will prefer to travel at time 0 and that a
traveler with positive travel time will prefer to depart before time 0 and
arrive after time 0. Finally, we assume that h is weakly decreasing, while w
is strictly increasing.
2Gender of representative person determined at random by flipping a Danish 20 kroner
coin.
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We shall refer to the case in which the utility rate at the destination is
linear as in the slope model (Fosgerau and Engelson, 2011), i.e.
h
(
t′
)
= β0 + β1t
′ (2)
w
(
t′
)
= γ0 + γ1t
′ (3)
Without loss of generality, we assume β0 = γ0, β1 = γ1 − 1.
Another important case is the step model (Fosgerau and Karlstrom,
2010)
h
(
t′
)
= α,w
(
t′
)
=
{
α− β, t′ < 0
α+ γ, t′ ≥ 0 (4)
2.2 Optimal behavior
The traveler chooses departure time to maximize his expected utility.
a∗ = argmax
a
{Eu(a, a+ T )},
which has first-order condition
h(a∗) = Ew(a∗ + T ).
The second-order condition is always satisfied.
Insert the optimal departure time into utility to find the optimal ex-
pected utility u∗ = Eu(a∗, a∗+T ). Then use enveloping to find the value of
travel time (VTT) as
−∂u
∗
∂µ
= h(a∗),
and the value of travel time variability (VTTV) as
−∂u
∗
∂σ
= E (Xw(a∗ + µ+ σX))
In the case of the slope model (Vickrey, 1973; Tseng and Verhoef, 2008;
Fosgerau and Engelson, 2011), the VTT is
−∂u
∗
∂µ
= β0 +
β1γ1
β1 + γ − 1µ,
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and the VTTV is expressed in terms of variance as
−∂u
∗
∂σ2
= β1/2.
In the case of the step model (Vickrey, 1969; Small, 1982; Fosgerau and
Karlstrom, 2010), the VTT is α while the value of standard deviation is
−∂u
∗
∂σ
= (β + γ)
∫ ∞
γ
β+γ
F−1(x)dx,
where F is the CDF of the standardized travel time X.
3 A rationally inattentive traveler
Now we present the rational inattention model, in which the traveler is al-
lowed to choose a signal, a random variable that is informative about the
random travel time. It is possible in principle to extend the neoclassical
model with an exogenous signal. The crucial difference between the neo-
classical model and the rational inattention model to be formulated is that
the rational inattention model allows the signal to be endogenously chosen.
For simplicity we assume that the traveler chooses his action, the depar-
ture time, from a finite set A. In the rational inattention model, the action
is not a single departure time, but a random variable, denoted by A, where
A ∈ A.
The traveler maximizes his net payoff, which is the expected scheduling
utility less the cost of information,
Λ (P ) = E (u (A, T ))− λI (A, T ) , (5)
where λ is the cost per unit of information and I (A, T ) is the amount of
information about travel time comprised in the action, which will be specified
below.
We note that there is no signal evident in this specification. As discussed
in the next section 3.1, the underlying model is that the traveler chooses
an information strategy, a signal, and then chooses how to respond to the
signal. In the formulation here we skip the intermediate step of designing the
signal, recognizing that the signal is implicit in the conditional distribution
p(A = a|T = t) that is chosen by the traveler. We discuss the information
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Figure 1: Decision process
cost I(A, T ) in Section 3.2 below.
3.1 Information strategy
The rationally inattentive traveler chooses a signal, a random variable that
contains information about travel time. The traveler is able to design his
signal, which means that he is able to select the distribution of the signal
conditional on the travel time. He is, however, not completely free in his
choice since he must pay a cost that increases as the signal becomes more
informative. The cost is not only monetary but includes any effort made by
the traveler.
Every day, the traveler observes that day’s realization of the signal and
makes inference about that day’s travel time distribution. Based on that
conditional distribution, he chooses the optimal departure time. That makes
the departure time a random variable with conditional distribution Pr(A =
a|T = t) and the departure time will contain information about travel time.
It is a standard result in the rational inattention literature (He´bert and
Woodford, 2016) that it is wasteful to obtain a signal that is more informa-
tive than the action, and we may therefore simplify, at no loss of generality,
by identifying the signal with the random action. Our rationally inatten-
tive traveler will then, effectively, be choosing the conditional distribution
Pr(A = a|T = t). This is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Write
p (a|t) = Pr (A = a|T = t)
as short-hand for the conditional probability and let
p (a) = Pr (A = a) =
∑
t∈T
p (a|t) p (t) (6)
be the unconditional probability. Let
P = {p (a|t) : a ∈ A, t ∈ T }
be the matrix of conditional probabilities. This matrix constitutes the in-
formation strategy chosen by the traveler.
3.2 The cost of information
We now discuss the cost of information. The simplest measure of information
is the mutual Shannon information, which is defined in terms of the Shannon
entropy. If a discrete random variable Z has density q (), then its Shannon
entropy H (Z) = −E log q (Z) captures the amount of information encoded
in Z.
The mutual Shannon information between random variables A and T is
I (A, T ) = H (A)− E (H (A|T ))
= E
(
log
p (A, T )
p (A) p (T )
)
= −
∑
a∈A
p (a) log p (a) +
∑
t∈T ,a∈A
p (a|t) p (t) log p (a|t) .
The mutual Shannon information I (A, T ) measures the information about
T present in A (or vice versa) (Cover and Thomas, 2006). For example, if
A and T are independent, then knowing A does not give any information
about T and vice versa, so their mutual information is zero. At the other
extreme, if A is a deterministic and invertible function of T then all infor-
mation conveyed by A is shared with T : knowing A determines the value
of T and vice versa. As a result, in this case the mutual information is the
same as the entropy of T (which is the same as the entropy of A).3
3Fosgerau et al. (2017) propose a natural generalization of the Shannon entropy, based
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3.3 Optimal rationally inattentive behavior
The rationally inattentive traveler finds the optimal strategy that maximizes
his payoff (5) subject to the consistency constraint (6). In the case when the
information cost is the mutual Shannon information, the optimal conditional
choice probabilities are
p (a|t) = exp (u (a, t) /λ) p (a)∑
a′
exp (u (a′, t) /λ) p (a′)
, (7)
where p (a) then depend on p (a|t) still through (6) (Mateˇjka and McKay,
2015; Fosgerau et al., 2017). This may be recognized as a logit model in
which actions with p (a) = 0 are omitted (Mateˇjka and McKay, 2015).
The actions for which p (a) > 0 may be thought of as a consideration
set, and the decision maker chooses among these actions according to a
plain logit model with alternative specific constants log p (a). There are
two extreme cases of information cost. If information is costless, λ = 0,
then travelers will simply choose the departure time producing maximum
utility with probability 1 under each realization of travel time. The matrix
of conditional probabilities p(a|t) then only contains zeros and ones. If, on
the other hand, information is infinitely costly, λ = ∞, then travellers will
acquire no information and will choose one departure time with probability
1 as in the neoclassical model and where the departure time will maximize
the expected utility under the prior for the travel time distribution.
Let Pˆ be the optimally chosen information strategy. Caplin et al. (2016)
derive a necessary and sufficient condition for Pˆ .
Proposition 1 (Caplin et al., 2016) The information strategy Pˆ is optimal
if and only if for all a ∈ A,
∑
t∈T
exp (u (a, t) /λ) p (t)∑
a′
exp (u (a′, t) /λ) p (a′)
≤ 1 (8)
with equality if p(a) > 0.
Caplin et al. (2016) propose an algorithm for the optimal solution. It
on duality in relation to additive random utility discrete choice models. Replacing the
Shannon entropy by their generalized entropy in the definition of mutual information
leads to generalized entropy rational inattention models. In this study, we consider the
information cost as Shannon entropy for simplicity.
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starts with a guess for P0(a). The update of P (a) follows
Pn+1(a) = E
 exp (u (a, T ) /λ)Pn(a)∑
a′
exp (u (a′, T ) /λ)Pn(a′)
 . (9)
The iteration of (9) has converged when the conditions in Proposition 1 are
satisfied (with some chosen precision). Caplin et al. (2016) prove that the
solution generated by this algorithm is optimal if the initial consideration
set with P0(a) > 0 is sufficiently large that it includes all possible choice
options.
We expect that the solution is unique in most cases. Mateˇjka and McKay
(2015) provide necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness, showing
that non-uniqueness is a very special case. We restate their sufficiency result
translated to the present context.
Lemma 2 (Mateˇjka and McKay (2015)) If the random vectors (exp(u(a, t)/λ), a ∈
A) are linearly independent with unit scaling, i.e. if there does not exist a
vector (αa, a ∈ A) such that ,
∀t ∈ T : 0 =
∑
a
αa exp (u(a, t)/λ)) ,
then the traveler’s problem has a unique solution.
It is intuitively clear that it is impossible to find such a vector (αa, a ∈ A)
in most cases. The next proposition establishes a slightly weaker version of
that impossibility.
Proposition 3 Let w be linear. There does not exist weights αa, a ∈ A
such that
0 =
∑
a
αa exp
(∫ a
0
h(t′)dt′ +
∫ 0
a+t
w(t′)dt′
)
,
for all t in an open set.
Fosgerau et al. (2017) show the following result, which is useful for re-
ducing the number of options that need to be considered.
Proposition 4 (Fosgerau et al., 2017) Suppose that option a is dominated
by option d in the sense that ∀t ∈ T : u (a, t) ≤ u (d, t) with strict inequality
for some t. Then p (a) = 0.
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In the context of random travel time, Proposition 2 means that very
early or late departure times are excluded from consideration.
One may wonder (and we have) whether gaps in the consideration set
are possible. Let a1, a2, a3 ∈ A, a1 < a2 < a3. Then the question is whether
it is possible that p(a1) > 0, p(a2) = 0, and p(a3) > 0. It turns out this
is possible, this is evident in the simulations provided below in this paper.
The next proposition provides a strong condition under which there can
be no gaps in the consideration set. This result conversely contributes to
generating some intuition regarding how gaps in the consideration set can
occur.
We say that a function f is superconcave, if exp(f) is concave. This
means that f is concave enough to overcome, in a sense, the convexity of
the exponential function. This is analogous to the concept of superconvexity.
Proposition 5 If the utility function is weakly superconcave as a function
of a for all t ∈ T , then there can be no gaps in the consideration set. If the
utility function is a strictly superconcave function of a, then the cardinality
of the consideration set is no larger than 2.
Proposition 5 suggests that we should expect gaps in the consideration
set to occur in most cases. This is intuitive since a consideration set with
low cardinality is cheap in terms of information. Spreading out the points
in the consideration set allows the traveler to compensate for a wider range
of travel times. Put in another way, we see that if a departure time is in the
consideration set, then nearby departure times may be omitted to reduce
the cost of information and losing only a little of the expected scheduling
utility.
In the step model of Fosgerau and Karlstrom (2010) and the slope model
of Fosgerau and Engelson (2011), the utility functions are linear and concave
functions of a, respectively. As the exponential function is convex, the utility
function in the step model is not superconcave. Whether the slope model
is superconcave depends on the unit information cost λ. For a fixed set
of departure times A and travel times T , then it can be shown with a
straightforward calculation that the utility function is superconcave if the
unit information cost λ is sufficiently large. That represents the situation
when information is very expensive, people will get very limited information
and only consider one or two options.
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Let Pˆ be the optimally chosen information strategy. Fosgerau et al.
(2017) also show, in the case when the information cost is the mutual Shan-
non information, that the optimal payoff is
Λ(Pˆ ) = λ
∑
a,t
p (a|t) p(t) log
(∑
a′
exp
(
u
(
a′, t
)
/λ
)
p
(
a′
))
.
Using the envelope theorem on the payoff (5), with the optimally chosen
information strategy, we immediately obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 6 The traveler’s optimal payoff decreases with the unit infor-
mation cost, i.e.
∂Λ
(
Pˆ
)
∂λ
< 0.
4 The marginal cost of travel time variability for
a rationally inattentive traveler
Consider the marginal change in payoff (5) following a change in the standard
deviation of travel time σ. As Pˆ is optimally chosen, the envelope theorem
implies that it may be considered constant. Moreover, σ does not affect the
constraints on P that probabilities must be positive and sum to 1. We need
then only consider the change in the expected scheduling utility Eu (A, T ).
Holding P constant at Pˆ , we have that the cost of a marginal increase in σ
is
−
∂Λ
(
Pˆ
)
∂σ
= −∂Λ (P )
∂σ
|P=Pˆ
= − ∂
∂σ
E
(∫ A
0
h (s) ds+
∫ 0
A+µ+σX
w (s) ds
)
= E (Xw (A+ µ+ σX)) .
This expression is similar to what is found in the neoclassical scheduling
model with an exogenously known travel time distribution and a fixed de-
parture time choice (Engelson and Fosgerau, 2016).
By Lemma 9 in the Appendix, this cost is necessarily positive.
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Proposition 7 The cost of travel time variability is positive,
−
∂Λ
(
Pˆ
)
∂σ
> 0.
The expression for the marginal cost of standard deviation of travel time
simplifies considerably in the case when w is linear as in the slope model (2)
and (3), since then
∂Λ
(
Pˆ
)
∂σ
= −E (X (γ0 + γ1 (A+ µ+ σX)))
= −E ((γ0 + γ1A+ γ1µ)X + γ1σX2)
= −E [E [(γ0 + γ1A+ γ1µ)X + γ1σX2|X]]
= −E [(γ0 + γ1E (A|X) + γ1µ)X + γ1σX2]
= −γ1E [E (A|X)X]− γ1σE
[
X2
]
= −γ1E (AX)− γ1σ,
by the law of iterated expectations and using that EX = 0, EX2 = 1.
Denote by |A| = #{a ∈ A|p(a) > 0} the number of elements in the
optimally chosen consideration set. In the case when the consideration set
consists of just one point, |A| = 1, then A and X are independent which
implies that E (AX) = EA · EX = 0. In this case, the marginal cost of
travel time variance is constant
−
∂Λ
(
Pˆ
)
∂σ2
= −
∂Λ
(
Pˆ
)
∂σ
1
2σ
=
γ1
2
.
This is exactly the result of Fosgerau and Engelson (2011). It emerges from
the rational inattention model as a special case when the optimally chosen
consideration set consists of just one point, and this corresponds to the
assumption in the Fosgerau and Engelson (2011) model that the traveler
chooses a single departure time. The Fosgerau and Engelson (2011) result
is very convenient when it applies, since then the marginal cost of travel
time variance depends only on the slope of the utility rate and not on the
distribution of travel time or the information cost.
Let us now consider the more general case when there are at least two
points in the consideration set. By Lemma 12 in the Appendix, if |A| >
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1, then E (AX) < 0 and hence the cost of travel time variability for the
rationally inattentive traveler is strictly smaller than γ1σ in the case of a
linear w. The conditional choice of departure time A will be dependent on
T and the marginal cost of travel time variance will be
−
∂Λ
(
Pˆ
)
∂σ2
=
γ1
2
+
γ1E(AX)
2σ
<
γ1
2
.
Altogether, we have established the following result.
Proposition 8 If the utility rate w is linear, then 0 < −∂Λ(Pˆ)
∂σ2
≤ γ12 . If
there are at least two points in the consideration set, |A| > 1, then the latter
inequality is strict.
In the case of the step model, we find that
∂Λ
(
Pˆ
)
∂σ
= − (β + γ)E (X1{A+T≥0}) ,
which is essentially the same result as in Fosgerau and Karlstrom (2010).
The term E
(
X1{A+T≥0}
)
is observable if scheduling preferences are known.
It is the mean standardized lateness. A difference from Fosgerau and Karl-
strom (2010) is that the event of being late now depends on the distribution
of A + T , which is influenced by the choice of the traveler in the present
model.
5 Numerical example
This section provides a numerical example to illustrate the behavior of the
rationally inattentive traveler facing random travel time variability. The
travel time distribution used in the example is normal with mean µ = 4 and
standard deviation σ = 1, it is shown in Figure 2.4
The traveler has linear utility rates (2) and (3) with parameters β0 =
γ0 = −1, β1 = −0.5 and γ1 = 0.5. Both the travel times and departure
times are discretized into intervals of width 0.05.
4We have also conducted simulations where travel time follows a triangular or a log-
normal distribution. The simulation results were qualitatively the same as those shown
here.
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Figure 2: Travel time distribution
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Figure 3: Unconditional probability with λ = 0.01
Figures 3-6 depict the unconditional departure time choice probabilities
p(a) under different values of the unit information cost λ. The consideration
set is the set of departure times with p(a) > 0. As expected from Proposition
4, very early or late departure times are never chosen. Comparing Figures
3 - 6, it can be seen that the cardinality of consideration sets decreases with
λ.
The shape of p(a) varies quite a lot with λ. In Figure 3, the highest
probability occurs in the middle of the consideration sets, while in Figures
4 and 6, the opposite is the case. We can explain the results as follows.
The unit information cost has two impacts on the departure time choice.
First of all, it determines the size of consideration sets with p(a) > 0. The
options with lower probability to produce a high payoff are ignored. That is
the reason the departure time choices far away from the center are ignored
in Figures 4 - 6, even if they could yield a high payoff under some specific
realizations of t. Second, they will become able to choose conditional de-
parture times producing larger utility with higher probability in each state
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Figure 4: Unconditional probability with λ = 0.1
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Figure 5: Unconditional probability with λ = 0.2
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Figure 6: Unconditional probability with λ = 0.25
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Figure 7: Marginal cost of travel time variability with different λ
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Figure 8: Optimal payoff and expected utility with different λ
t. According to the analysis of entry test for each choice in Caplin et al.
(2016), an option is more likely to be chosen when its utility is high in
states where other options yield much lower utility. That can explain the
shape of Figures 3 and 4. When one departure time a is chosen with high
unconditional probability, the unconditional probability of departure times
nearby may drop as they produce similar utility as a. The optimal infor-
mation strategy balances the desire to achieve high utility in very different
states with the desire for parsimoniousness. As shown in Figures 4 and 5,
rationally inattentive travelers will consider fewer options when information
is expensive.
As the unit information cost increases, the consideration set shrinks and
comprises fewer and fewer points. This implies that p(a) for any a ∈ A
depends non-monotonically on λ (except if p(a) is always zero).
According to Proposition 8, the marginal effect of travel time variance
is smaller than the case without information. Figure 7 shows the result. In
all cases considered here, −∂Λ(P )
∂σ2
< γ12 = 0.25. It is evident that −∂Λ(P )∂σ2
18
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
λ
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
co
st
Figure 9: Information cost with different λ
increases with unit information cost λ. As information becomes more expen-
sive, travelers acquire less information and hence become more influenced
by travel time variability. It seems it should be possible to establish this
formally, but we have not been able to do this.
Figure 8 and 9 shows the information cost, expected utility and optimal
payoff for different values of λ. We have established in Proposition 6 that
the optimal payoff is decreasing in λ. It is intuitive that the expected utility
also decreases with λ because travellers are less able to respond to random
travel time with a less informative information strategy.
Figure 9 shows that the (total) information cost is non-monotonic with
respect to λ. For low values of λ, the change in λ dominates the change
in the quantity of information acquired, I(A, T ), and hence the information
cost increases. For high values of λ, the opposite is the case. At λ = 0.25
as in Figure 6, there is only one option left in the consideration set and
the information cost can reduce only very little. Comparison of Figures 3-6
shows that the information cost has a large impact on the departure time
choice, even if it only accounts for a small share of the optimal payoff.
6 Conclusion
This paper has set up a rational inattention model for the traveler choice of
departure time under random travel time variability. The model takes into
account that travelers may choose to be more or less informed about the
variation in travel time, using the information to condition their choice of
departure time. Implicit in the model is a signal that intermediates between
travel time and departure time choice, which makes the departure time
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choice a random variable that carries information about the random travel
time. The model generates predictions that all seem very reasonable.
Going beyond the present results, we may ask if travelers actually do
acquire information. This is possible to observe in principle. We would just
need to observe the distribution of (A, T ) for groups of travelers and check
if the mutual information is positive. To do this, a complication is that
it is necessary to ensure that travelers are comparable, i.e. that they face
the same travel time distribution and have the same (or similar) scheduling
preferences.
The rational inattention model might be useful for studying consider-
ation sets. It is a very attractive feature of that model that it generates
consideration sets that are formed endogenously based on preferences.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.
Let w be linear. Assume for all t in some neighborhood that
0 =
∑
a
αa exp
(∫ a
0
h(t′)dt′ +
∫ 0
a+t
w(t′)dt′
)
,
where a ∈ A are all different. We will arrive at a contradiction.
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Index A = {a1, . . . , aK}. Differentiating repeatedly and using that w′ is
a constant shows that
0 =
K∑
k=1
wn (ak + t)αk exp
(∫ ak
0
h(t′)dt′ +
∫ 0
ak+t
w(t′)dt′
)
(10)
for all integer n ≥ 0. But the matrix
V =

1 w (a1 + t) w
2 (a1 + t) · · · wK−1 (a1 + t)
1 w (a2 + t) w
2 (a2 + t) · · · wK−1 (a2 + t)
1 w (a3 + t) w
2 (a3 + t) · · · wK−1 (a3 + t)
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
1 w (aK + t) w
2 (aK + t) w
K−1 (aK + t)

is a Vandermonde matrix and hence is invertible. We have then from (10)
that(
α1 exp
(∫ a1
0
h(t′)dt′ +
∫ 0
a1+t
w(t′)dt′
)
, . . . , αK exp
(∫ aK
0
h(t′)dt′ +
∫ 0
aK+t
w(t′)dt′
))
V = 0
and hence that(
α1 exp
(∫ a1
0
h(t′)dt′ +
∫ 0
a1+t
w(t′)dt′
)
, . . . , αK exp
(∫ aK
0
h(t′)dt′ +
∫ 0
aK+t
w(t′)dt′
))
= 0V −1 = 0,
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose a1, a2, a3 ∈ A, a2 = a1 + (1 − )a3,
0 <  < 1. If p(a1) > 0 and p(a3) > 0, then
∑
t∈T
exp (u (a2, t) /λ) p (t)∑
a′
exp (u (a′, t) /λ) p (a′)
≥
∑
t∈T
( exp (u (a1, t) /λ) + (1− )(exp (u (a3, t) /λ))) p (t)∑
a′
exp (u (a′, t) /λ) p (a′)
= 
∑
t∈T
exp (u (a1, t) /λ)) p (t)∑
a′
exp (u (a′, t) /λ) p (a′)
+ (1− )
∑
t∈T
exp (u (a3, t) /λ) p (t)∑
a′
exp (u (a′, t) /λ) p (a′)
= 1
Therefore p(a2) > 0. If the utility function is strictly superconcave, the
equality will never hold, which contradicts Proposition 1, implying that the
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cardinality of the consideration set can be no larger than 2.
Lemma 9 Let X be a non-degenerate random variable with mean zero. Let
f be an increasing function. Then E [Xf (X)] > 0.
Proof. Note that
E [Xf (X)] = E [X (f (X)− f (0))]
= E
[
1{X<0}X (f (X)− f (0))
]
+ E
[
1{X≥0}X (f (X)− f (0))
]
.
Since the event that X < 0 occurs with positive probability, the first
term is the product of two negative numbers, while the second term is the
product of two positive numbers. Hence the conclusion follows.
We will sign E (AX) through a series of lemmas.
Lemma 10 Suppose |A| > 1. For a general utility rate w, let 0 < p (a|x) <
1 for all (a, x) ∈ A× X . Then for every x ∈ X there is a point ax such that
∂p(a|x)
∂x > 0 if and only if a < ax.
Proof. The requirement that |A| > 1 is necessary to enable points a ∈ A
to exist with 0 < p(a|x) < 1.
We are holding the distribution of X constant and hence the probabilities
p (a) do not change. Use (1), (6) and (7) to find that
∂p (a|x)
∂x
= −σ
λ
w (a+ µ+ σx) p (a|x)+p (a|x)
∑
a′∈A
σ
λ
w
(
a′ + µ+ σx
)
p
(
a′|x) .
Then ∂p(a|x)∂x > 0 if and only if∑
a′∈A
w
(
a′ + µ+ σx
)
p
(
a′|x) > w (a+ µ+ σx) .
The LHS does not depend on a, while the LHS is monotonically increasing
as a function of a. The inequality is satisfied at a = minA, since 0 <
p (minA|x) < 1. The inequality is not satisfied at a = maxA by the parallel
argument. The conclusion follows by monotonicity of w.
Lemma 11 For a general utility rate w, holding the distribution of X con-
stant.
∂E (A|X = x)
∂x
< 0.
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Proof. Let B = {a ∈ A : p(a) = 0}. Compute
∂E (A|X = x)
∂x
=
∑
a∈A\B
a
∂p (a|x)
∂x
+
∑
a∈B
a
∂p (a|x)
∂x
=
∑
a∈A\B
(a− ax) ∂p (a|x)
∂x
< 0,
where we have used the previous lemma and that
∑
a∈A
ax
∂p(a|x)
∂x = 0.
Lemma 12 Suppose that |A| > 1. Then E (AX) < 0.
Proof. Let X be the set of support points for the standardized travel time
distribution. Let f (x) : [minX ,maxX ] → R be the continuous extension
of E (A|X = x) : X → R. that linearly interpolates between points. Then
f is decreasing by Lemma 11 and defined at x = 0. Note also that f < 0
everywhere. Now,
E (AX) = E (E (A|X)X)
=
∑
x
p (x)xf (x) ,
and this is negative by Lemma 9.
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